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CANCELLATION OF DEBT AND OTHER INCIDENTAL ITEMS
OF INCOME: PURITAN TAX RULES IN THE U.S.
RICHARD C.E. BECK*
I. INTRODUCTION
We are all either Platonists or Aristotelians, as the saying goes,
but it would be difficult to find any Aristotelian tax professors in the
United States. Our received doctrines regarding income are purely
Platonist. Income is one single idea, and this idea is termed com-
prehensive taxation or the (Schantz-) Haig-Simons definition of in-
come as the algebraic sum of the taxpayer's consumption and
savings for the year.1 All taxpayers who enjoy income conferring
equal economic power must be taxed equally, because a dollar is a
dollar, however acquired. To leave any dollar untaxed, or taxed at
a favorable rate, would violate the principle of equality termed
"horizontal equity."
This article examines some miscellaneous and incidental forms
of income from a comparative point of view. It appears that U.S.
law includes as income more types of incidental items than most
other countries. The items considered here are (in no particular
order) found money and property, gambling gains, gains from a
personal hobby, isolated criminal profits, prizes and awards, dam-
ages, and gains from sale of personal-use property, especially per-
sonal residences. The article concludes with an in-depth
examination of income from the cancellation or forgiveness of
debts ("COD" income). These items have in common, for the most
part, the fact that they are not usually associated with recurrent bus-
iness and investment, which are at the heart of the income tax, but
rather with transactions of private life.
Other examples of questionable taxes might be adduced, but
the general picture seems clear enough: in the United States, in
contrast to the tax systems of most other countries that seem more
* Professor of Federal Taxation, New York Law School. L.L.M. New York Uni-
versity Law School, 1984, J.D. 1980; Ph.D Yale University, 1973; B.A. University of Chi-
cago, 1963.
1. See generally HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938).
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practical and realistic, all economic benefit of any kind is taxable at
least in principle, even if enforcement is impractical or even impos-
sible. In some cases the U.S. rules overshoot the mark altogether,
and result in taxation even where there is no gain at all.
Americans are often stereotyped as idealistic (or more nega-
tively, as moralistic), and it is true that we often idolize principle
over practicality. Attempts to legislate morality form a significant
part of our legal tradition, and laws that are purely aspirational in
nature still reflect a continuing legacy of our Puritan past. Such
legislation runs the gamut from the laughable, like our many state
laws that forbid deviant sex even between husband and wife, to the
disastrous, like our constitutional prohibition of alcohol in the
1920's.
No part of our legal system is completely free of these Puritan
tendencies, and this includes tax law. One might almost say that
just as the government has a "zero tolerance" for illegal drugs, it
also has zero tolerance for untaxed income, and with a similar de-
gree of success. In most of the examples of incidental income I
have chosen, there is little or no revenue at stake, and it is precisely
because so little is at stake that these examples can be so instructive
about our legal culture.
II. SOURCES OF LAW
Congress itself seems to have embraced the unitary or global
approach to income. The Internal Revenue Code ("IRC" or
"Code") section 61 (a) defines "gross income" with breathtaking cir-
cularity: it is "all income from whatever source derived." The provi-
sion goes on to provide fifteen examples, such as compensation for
services, gross income from business, gains from dealings in prop-
erty, interest, rents, and so forth, but the Code is careful to point
out that these are only examples, and that the circular definition is
not limited to the categories enumerated. Income is both global
and open-textured.
The courts have occasionally attempted to clarify the statutory
definition of income. The most recent attempt by the Supreme
Court is widely admired and quoted for its comprehensiveness: in-
come is "any accession to wealth, clearly realized, over which the
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taxpayer has dominion."2 The Glenshaw Glass Court devised this
ringing phrase to replace an earlier Supreme Court definition of
income as the "gain from labor, or capital, or both combined,"
3
which it erroneously thought was not broad enough to encompass
as taxable income a "windfall" gain of punitive damages. The older
definition was perfectly adequate, however, because to obtain the
reward of treble damages under the antitrust law the taxpayer must
risk time and money - viz. labor and capital - to earn it in a law-
suit. These risks include not only the actual expenses of bringing
and pursuing legal action, but also the possibility of ruinous retalia-
tion by powerful competitors. Thus, the treble damages sub judice
did not fall from heaven without action by the taxpayer, and can
hardly be likened to finding money in the back seat of a taxicab.
The Supreme Court's ringing definition in Glenshaw Glass is no
more than dictum, but it has been widely cited and approved as
supporting the widest possible conception of taxable income, as for
example in the very first case to be examined here, that of found
money or property.
III. INCIDENTAL ITEMS OF INCOME
A. Found Money or Property
On the somewhat dubious authority of Glenshaw Glass that
"windfalls" are taxable, the U.S. Treasury Department ("Treasury")
promulgated regulations that require taxpayers to include as in-
come the fair market value of "treasure trove," meaning found
property or money.4 The rule is impeccable from the point of view
of Haig-Simons; however, it suffers several disadvantages in the
practical world, which is probably why no other country I know of
has such a rule. In the first place, there is no practical method of
enforcement. Withholding is of course impossible, and so is infor-
mation reporting. In addition, even if the found property does
come to the IRS's attention, there may be difficult problems of valu-
2. See Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (holding that
treble or punitive damages awarded under antitrust law are taxable).
3. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (holding stock dividend nontax-
able; income includes only realized gains from capital, from labor, or from both
combined).
4. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (as amended in 1993).
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ation. The government has never actually attempted to apply the
treasure-trove rule in the many situations that inevitably do come to
its attention (although these are probably all in a business context),
such as successful prospecting for gold or oil, or sunken Spanish
galleons, and instead has always waited until the found property has
been sold for cash before imposing any tax. 5
In most cases taxpayers will not report a windfall find even of
spendable cash, and therefore the desired goal of horizontal equal-
ity with other forms of taxable gain cannot be met. A second,
deeper problem lies in the fact that a taxpayer who loses property
or money is of course not permitted a deduction, which would be
an open invitation to fraud. Our tax theorists seem to respect the
dollar-is-a-dollar-regardless-of-source principle only on the upside.
Diversity is the rule for losses, and in this venue, all our theorists are
Aristotelians. Thus, if the taxpayer loses $10 of his own money and
finds $10 interleaved in the pages of an old book, he is (in princi-
ple) taxed notwithstanding the fact that his economic position is
unchanged. Equal tax treatment of earners and finders is impossi-
ble to achieve, but equality between finders and losers is both possi-
ble and fair. In my view, the tax system should probably ignore
found property altogether.
B. Gambling
Most countries seem to remove gambling gains and losses from
the tax system, but not the United States. All gambling gains are
taxable in the United States; gambling losses, however, are deducti-
ble only as an offset to gambling gains for the same taxable year
under IRC section 165(d), so that excess gambling losses may not
be deducted to shelter any other kind of income. This treatment of
gambling gains and losses suffers from several of the problems
5. This fact has been noted by the authors of a recent article, who point out that
the treasure-trove rule has been applied only in one reported case that involved out-
dated currency found in a piano. With respect to found property, they correctly argue
that it should not be taxed, even in principle, because it is similar to a bargain
purchase. If a taxpayer is fortunate enough to buy property for less than its value, he is
not taxed until his gain is realized by sale. The authors conclude that the rule should
be limited to found money. I am not sure that even this limited conclusion is reasona-
ble. See Lawrence A. Zelenak & Martin J. McMahon Jr., Taxing Baseballs and Other Found
Property, 84 TAx NOTES 1299 (1999).
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noted above in connection with found (and lost) property. Gains
from private gambling will generally not be reported, nor will most
small gains even at public gambling establishments. Only a few re-
porting requirements are imposed on casinos and racetracks for
very large winnings from a single bet, but reporting is generally not
required and is not feasible for the vast majority of gains and losses.
It might be argued that, except in rare and unusual circum-
stances, the United States taxes gambling gains only in appearance.
It seems fair to say most gamblers lose, and because net gambling
losses are not deductible for tax purposes, they are in effect outside
the tax system. For this reason, most winnings in the United States
are not taxable, whether defacto because they are not reported, or
de jure because the losses of most taxpayers will outweigh their
gains, or some combination of the two. The rare enforcement is of
course unfair to those few who must pay tax on a reportable gain
and have insufficient losses for the year to offset the gain. But still
more unfair is the fact that if these unlucky few gamble over a pe-
riod of years, they are probably paying taxes on losses rather than
gains. This is because the deduction for gambling losses may not
be carried forward to future years. Over long periods of time it is
very probable that taxpayers who gamble frequently lose more than
they gain, and over a lifetime gamblers will nearly always suffer
losses. This is especially true for gambling against commercial insti-
tutions such as casinos where over time, the odds in favor of the
house guarantee gains to the casino, and doom the taxpayer to
unavoidable losses.
The problem is still worse with government lotteries. Most lot-
teries give little chance to the ticket buyer because they pay out as
winnings hardly more than 60% of what they receive in ticket sales.
State lotteries are therefore already in effect very high taxes on the
poor who can least afford it, and so taxing lottery winnings again as
"income" seems excessive. At the very least, a taxpayer ought to be
able to use his lifetime store of losing tickets and other bets to offset
the one-time "lucky" gain, but this is not permitted.
It would be simpler and fairer to ignore gambling gains and
losses altogether, as most other countries do. The logical and effec-
tive way to tax gambling is to tax the business profits of commercial
casinos.
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
C. Hobby Gains
Hobbies that are not managed primarily as a business for profit
do occasionally produce gains, and such gains are fully taxable in
the United States at least in principle, but are ignored for tax pur-
poses in many other countries, for example in France,
6 Germany, 7
and the United Kingdom." Collectors of coins, stamps, antique
cars, or racehorses may occasionally sell some item at a profit or win
something at a race, and amateur chess or card players may win
money or prizes in competition, and so forth. All such gains are
taxable in the United States.
Here again, however, the U.S. system of comprehensive taxa-
tion is something less than it might appear at first look. Deductions
are allowed for the cost of earning hobby gains from a particular
activity, but not in excess of gains from that same activity under IRC
section 183(b), in almost exactly the same fashion as gambling
losses are deductible. 9 The costs of earning hobby gains from a
given activity each year are almost by necessity greater than the
profits from that activity, because if profits exceed losses on a regu-
lar basis, the activity will usually be treated as a business rather than
as a hobby. Thus, unless a hobby gain is both extraordinary in
amount as well as non-periodic in nature, it will probably not be
taxed because of the offsetting associated costs. Finally, it may be
noted that here too, as for treasure-trove and for gambling, the ad-
ministrative impossibility of imposing third-party reporting makes
actual tax collection a matter almost entirely dependent upon tax-
payer honesty and goodwill. German law, no doubt for these rea-
sons, treats hobby gains as generally tax-exempt, and (realistically,
in my view) treats gambling winnings as a form of tax-exempt hobby
gain.
6. See C. DAVID ET AL, LEs GRANDS ARRtTS DE LAJURISPRUDENCE FISCALE 210-11
(3rd ed. 2000).
7. Interview with Professor Manfred Moessner (Osnabrueck).
8. Interview with Professor David Southern.
9. Except that gambling gains and losses from all sources are lumped together,
whereas hobby gains and losses are kept separate for each hobby.
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D. Criminal Profits
As in most other countries, the profits from illegal activities are
taxable in the United States, whether the activity is a regular and
ongoing business, or merely an incidental or one-time event.
There is money in crime, of course, but most criminals are unlikely
to report their gains for fear of apprehension and punishment.
The standard rationale for taxability is that it would be unfair to
impose taxes on honest and law-abiding businessmen while exempt-
ing criminals. This is reasonable enough, but it could be countered
simply by increasing criminal fines and penalties.
One problem with the taxation of stolen or embezzled money
is that it can often result in taxation without gain. If the appre-
hended embezzler does not have enough money both to repay the
rightful owner and to pay the IRS, who should win? Sometimes the
IRS wins, if the money in the embezzler's possession cannot be
traced directly back to the crime. If the embezzler does pay both,
he is in principle entitled to an offsetting deduction for taxes paid
on money he did not keep. If the repayment is in a later year, how-
ever, the deduction may be inadequate or even worthless if the em-
bezzler does not have enough income to take full advantage of the
deduction. In such situations the result is taxable income without
gain.
Perhaps the most serious problem in taxing criminal enter-
prise is the political risk that the revenue administration will be
pressured into enlistment in the War against Drugs and lose track
of its primary function of collecting revenue. Already more than
60% of the criminal investigation division of the IRS now works in
the area of drug enforcement, despite estimates that less than 10%
of the revenue lost from criminal tax evasion is due to illegal busi-
ness, and more than 90% is tax cheating in legitimate legal busi-
nesses. The tax authorities are of course not really trying to enforce
the tax laws against drug traffickers and to collect revenue from
them; that is only a pretext to put them out of business. If the gov-
ernment really wanted tax revenues from drugs, it would legalize
them and collect taxes as it does from alcohol and tobacco.
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E. Prizes and Awards
Until the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the United States, like most
other countries, excluded from income tax prizes awarded for
achievement in the arts and sciences, such as the Nobel Prize. Such
prizes are fully taxable now, as if their former exclusion was a sort of
loophole, rather than an additional reward for services benefiting
the public. This stands in curious contrast with the doctrine of pub-
lic policy that forbids deduction of otherwise legitimate business ex-
penses under IRC section 162(f) if they are also fines, such as a
trucking company's payment of speeding tickets. 10 The received ra-
tionale for disallowing the deduction is that it takes some of the
sting out of the punishment. This is true, but it is equally true that
taxing a prize for merit takes some of the pleasure out of the honor.
F Damages for Personal Injury
Damages for personal injuries have always been exempt from
tax on the theory that they are not gains, they are merely a mone-
tary substitute for some loss, such as lost health or reputation or
peace of mind, and so akin to a return of capital. Congress
amended the Code in 1986 to narrow this exemption. Under cur-
rent law, only damages awarded for physical injuries are exempt.
Damages are now taxable for all non-physical injuries, including
emotional distress, defamation, sexual harassment, and sex or age
discrimination. This was a step in the wrong direction. The justifi-
cation for allowing awards of compensatory damages for moral in-
jury is just the same for physical injury, namely a replacement of
what has been lost. A replacement of what has been lost is by its
nature not a gain, but an attempt to return the victim to his status
quo ante. Thus, all such indemnities should be tax exempt, as they
are for example in France,11 except where the loss has already been
deducted, or where what has been lost would itself have been taxa-
ble (e.g., an award of back pay).
10. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
11. Interview with Professor Daniel Gutmann.
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G. Personal-Use Property and Residential Housing
In the United States, gains from the sale of personal-use prop-
erty are in principle all taxable, but losses are completely forbid-
den. This is therefore not a system of quarantining losses so that
they are only deductible against income of the same category, like
our restrictions on capital losses, or on the gambling and hobby
losses discussed above, but rather an absolute and one-sided prohi-
bition like that for lost and found property. On the other hand,
except in the case of personal residences, there is little likelihood of
any profit in the first place. It would be rare to make a gain from
the sale of a used car, books, or clothes. It is only in the case of
collectible items such as antique furniture that taxpayers stand any
chance of making gains, and if a taxpayer does so more than occa-
sionally, he is likely to be regarded as engaged in a taxable business.
Moreover, there is no way for the IRS to monitor the occasional
private sale of personal-use property. Thus, the tax is more theoret-
ical than real.
By contrast, large gains are possible in the case of sales of a
personal residence, even if such sales are relatively infrequent in
the life of any given taxpayer. As with other kinds of personal-use
property, a deduction for losses is prohibited. Gains are taxable in
principle, but exceptions nearly swallow up the rule. Like most
countries, the United States has rules that limit or eliminate taxes
on capital gains from the sale of a taxpayer's principal residence.
In 1997 these rules were significantly narrowed to limit the exclu-
sion to a maximum of $500,000 of gain for a married couple and to
$250,000 for an individual. In addition, some bright-line time re-
quirements were added under the new IRC section 121: the tax-
payer must not use the exclusion more than once in a two-year
period, and he must have both owned the residence and lived in it
as his principal residence for two years out of the five years preced-
ing the sale. Failure to meet any of the two-year requirements re-
sults in the complete loss of the tax exemption, unless the taxpayer
can show that the failure was due to health or employment reasons,
or to unforeseen circumstances. In the event the taxpayer can show
one of these exculpatory reasons, his exemption limit is neverthe-
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less reduced proportionately. 12 The exemption applies only to one
principal residence and not to secondary residences, as in France.
The dollar limits create some geographic injustice. Housing is
far more expensive on the East and West coasts than in less urban
areas of the United States, and this unfortunately works to the dis-
advantage of taxpayers who live in the more expensive areas.
13 It
would be far more desirable to have a simple rule, as most countries
do, that .exempts gain from the sale of a private residence
altogether.
Finally, it should be pointed out that any taxation of housing
gains seems inherently unfair because housing losses are strictly
nondeductible. The rationale for disallowing such losses is that
housing is a personal expense or "consumption." This classification
seems doubtful, however, because no one would buy a home if he
expected to consume its value or to suffer a loss. He would rent
instead. The purchase of a home is for most taxpayers their largest
single investment. Considered as an investment, a deduction for
losses on sale of a home should probably be allowed, at least where
the loss is due to market forces and not to failure to maintain the
property. Any loss from the sale of land under the house, as op-
posed to the house itself, is always due to market forces, and there-
fore should be allowed as a deduction like any other capital loss. As
long as a deduction for losses is disallowed, fairness suggests that
the exemption for gains should be unlimited. Under current law, if
a taxpayer suffers a loss from the sale of one residence, and enjoys a
gain on the sale of the next, he may be taxed on the gain, but ob-
12. For example, if a taxpayer's employment forces him to move after owning his
residence only one year, which is half the required period of time, his $250,000 exclu-
sion limit is also reduced by half, to $125,000. This seems to me unjustified. If the
purpose of the two-year rules is to establish (i) that the residence in question really does
serve as the taxpayer's home, and (ii) that the taxpayer is not engaged in a recurrent
business of fixing up and reselling houses, it should follow that a showing of health or
work necessity ought to preserve the exemption in its entirety, as it would, for example,
in France. The current rules seem to elevate what are after all mere indicia of eligibility
into ends in themselves.
13. This is part, but an unnecessary part, of a pervasive pattern of geographic
unfairness in a progressive tax system. Generally, where prices and wages are high,
taxpayers must pay a higher proportion of tax on income of the same purchasing
power.
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tains no offsetting relief from the loss. Taken together, the system
produces taxable income without economic gain.
IV. CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS
A. General
An American tax lawyer would be very surprised to see income
from cancellation or discharge of indebtedness ("COD" income)
classified as a form of incidental gain, and even more surprised to
learn that most other countries do not tax COD income at all, at
least for individuals. In American jurisprudence, COD income is
regarded as a fundamental form of gain, and in U.S. casebooks and
reference works the subject generally occupies a large and very
complex chapter of its own.
The general rule is stated with disarming simplicity at IRC sec-
tion 61 (a) (12), which since 1954 simply adds to the list of examples
of gross income "discharge of indebtedness." The item is not other-
wise defined. The government had maintained that COD was taxa-
ble income as early as its 1918 regulations, but it was not upheld in
the courts until the 1931 Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Kirby
Lumber,14 where the taxpayer made a profit from repurchase of its
own bonds on the open market at a discount. Before Kirby Lumber,
the courts had consistently held that COD was not taxable, because
under the doctrine of Eisner v. Macomber,'5 it provided no realized
gain in the form of money or property. The taxpayer merely ob-
tained a reduced cost in its assets, without any additional liquidity
with which to pay tax. There is much to say in favor of this early
doctrine of no-realization, both from the point of view of theory
and of practice.
Oddly enough, Kirby Lumber, which is always cited as the foun-
dation of COD income, said not a single word about cancellation of
debts, and imposed tax only because the taxpayer had realized a
"clear gain." Indeed it had, but its gain had nothing to do with
cancellation of debt. All the gain was due solely to the fact that it
made a profit in the securities market from a transaction resem-
bling a short sale. That Kirby Lumber's bonds were cancelled after-
14. 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
15. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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wards was purely incidental to its gain, and due solely to a rule of
corporate law that does not permit a corporation to owe itself
money. If the taxpayer could have kept its bonds alive for later re-
sale like treasury stock, it would have enjoyed exactly the same gain.
Despite the fact that cancellation of the bonds was not the cause of
the gain in Kirby Lumber, the tax bar seems to have accepted without
murmur the government's exaggerated if not unwarranted inter-
pretation of the decision: that the cancellation of a debt produces
taxable income.
B. Problems with Treating COD as Income
1. Theoretical
The standard explanation today for taxing COD income is
based upon the fact that the proceeds of a loan are tax exempt
because of the assumption that the loan will be repaid; if the as-
sumption proves false when a debt is cancelled, the exemption
should no longer apply, and the loan proceeds should be taxed
nunc pro tunc to reflect the taxpayer's increase in net worth. The
theory is open to attack, as we will see, but it is at the practical level
that the tax suffers from its most serious defects. First, most COD
creates no liquidity with which to pay tax. And second, so many
exceptions are necessary that the rules produce more confusion
than revenue.
This "loan proceeds" explanation is not entirely persuasive as a
theoretical matter either, because our tax system does not normally
tax appreciation in wealth until it is realized by sale or exchange.
Also, the loan proceeds theory can at bestjustify taxing cancellation
of loans of money, but not debts of other kinds. Unfortunately,
nothing in the Code or regulations limits COD income to loans of
money.
For example, Congress clearly intended the cancellation of at
least some purchase-money debts to be taxable, because it enacted
a provision that treats the reduction of purchase-money debt as a
non-taxable (downward) adjustment to the purchase price of prop-
erty, but only provided that (i) the lender is the same person as the
seller, (ii) the property still remains in the hands of the borrower-
purchaser, and (iii) the debt still remains in the hands of the seller-
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lender.16 These rules seem designed to limit relief to renegotia-
tions regarding the property rather than the debt, but they do not
do so effectively, and they are far too restrictive. There are no such
restrictions upon a cash refund of part of the purchase price, which
would always be treated as a tax-free return of capital, and yet a cash
refund seems economically indistinguishable. These rules can lead
to absurdities. Suppose, for example, that a taxpayer purchases
property for $100 using a bank credit card, finds the purchase un-
satisfactory, and negotiates a reduction of the debt to $50 with the
issuing bank. This $50 reduction would apparently be taxable be-
cause the bank is not the seller. And yet if the credit card issuer
were a department store that is itself the seller, the identical trans-
action would be tax-free. Even stranger, if the taxpayer paid the
issuing bank the $100 in full, and then made a complaint after-
wards and received a $50 refund in cash, the refund would be tax-
free.
Neither the Code nor the regulations address the question
whether COD is taxable if the debt was incurred for the purchase of
services rather than property, and there is apparently no reported
case law on the question. In my opinion, all reductions of purchase
money debt should be tax-free because the result is a bargain
purchase or the creation of unrealized appreciation, neither of
which is normally taxable.
There is also an exception for "disputed debts" in the case law.
Obviously, if there is doubt whether money was ever borrowed in
the first place, or the amount is in question, so is the amount of
COD income. But very confusingly, the leading case in this area, N.
Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner,17 had nothing to with a dispute over the
amount of the debt. It was actually a case of purchase-price
adjustment. 1
8
16. SeeI.R.C. § 108(e)(5) (2000).
17. 40 B.T.A. 1263 (1939).
18. The taxpayer had bought stock from the issuer on credit, and when the stock
became worthless, the taxpayer demanded rescission of the sale because the stock had
not been properly registered. The parties settled by the taxpayer paying half the prom-
ised purchase price. The government claimed income tax from the debt reduction,
and lost on the ground that the debt was "disputed." Actually the taxpayer had suffered
a loss for the amount paid in settlement, not a gain from the cancelled portion of the
debt.
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The most important statutory exception by far is an exemption
for taxpayers whose debts are discharged in bankruptcy or who are
insolvent. This is of course the most common reason why creditors
forgive debts. Obviously, one cannot squeeze blood from a turnip,
and even the government allowed for the insolvency exception as
early as its 1918 regulations. 19
The insolvency exception under IRC section 108(a) does not
provide an absolute immunity, however. The insolvent taxpayer
must pay a price for his exemption from COD income, viz. he must
surrender under IRC section 108(b) dollar-for-dollar any tax attrib-
utes that might reduce taxes in the future, such as net operating
(business) loss carryforwards ("NOLs"), capital loss carryforwards,
and basis in assets. This rule applies only to taxpayers who have
such tax attributes.
These IRC section 108(b) attribute reduction rules are clearly
justified, because a taxpayer who loses borrowed money in a busi-
ness does not suffer a genuine loss if the debt is cancelled after-
wards. The net effect is that the taxpayer has lost the creditor's
money rather than his own, and therefore no deduction should be
allowed. There is, however, no need to make the appropriate ad-
justments through the rules for COD income.
In such situations it would be much simplerjust to disallow the
loss carryforwards to the extent of the debt cancellation, that is to
say, to the extent the taxpayer has not actually suffered a loss. Us-
ing such a rule, it would be irrelevant whether or not the taxpayer is
solvent. In the case of a taxpayer who is solvent, there is no reason
to create COD income, but then leave the taxpayer's losses intact -
that seems backwards. It would make more sense simply to disallow
the related losses instead. Such a rule should only apply in the case
of a business or investment debt. There is no cogent reason for
individuals to incur COD income or any other adjustments where
the cancelled loan is personal in nature and no deductions are at
stake.
19. Purists have attacked even this exception, however, on the ground that no
other forms of income become tax exempt due to insolvency.
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2. Practical Problems
Most debt cancellation is undoubtedly due to insolvency, which
produces no revenue. The Treasury evidently became dissatisfied
that it collected very little revenue from COD income, at least from
individuals. Instead of considering repeal of the rules for taxing
COD as essentially fruitless, however, the Treasury decided that the
remedy was more enforcement. Since 1996, the Treasury regula-
tions require all lending institutions to report COD of $600 or
more. Banks in particular protested that such reporting would
cause huge expense for little or no revenue, because most COD is
not taxable. The banks won a partial victory. All COD outside of
bankruptcy must still be reported, whether taxable or not. If debts
are discharged in bankruptcy, however, reporting is required only if
the bank is aware that the debts were incurred for business or in-
vestment purposes.20 The new reporting requirement was a giant
step in the wrong direction, as will be seen in the Anderson case
described in the next section. Because most COD is not taxable
even outside of bankruptcy, the new reporting rules are likely to
cause immense friction for little or no revenue.
The most troublesome of all the exceptions from the point of
view of pure confusion has proved to be the cancellation of debts
for which the taxpayer received no consideration. One early deci-
sion correctly held that cancellation of such a debt should not be
taxable.21 The facts were much like those in Kirby Lumber, except
the taxpayer's bonds had originally been issued as a dividend rather
than in exchange for cash. Nothing was borrowed, and so the re-
purchase at a price below par did not generate any gain.
Examples of other such situations are abundant, although
there is little or no case law on the subject. If a taxpayer incurs a
judgment debt for causing a traffic accident he has borrowed noth-
ing, and reduction or cancellation of such a debt should not result
in taxable income. The result is avoidance of a threatened loss,
rather than a gain. Avoidance of a threatened loss does not in-
crease the taxpayer's capacity to pay tax, and is not within the scope
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6050P-1 (d) (1996).
21. See Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that
repurchase of bonds for less than par not taxable where bonds had been issued as a
dividend and without value received).
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even of the most comprehensive idea of taxable income. Com-
promises of debts for child support or alimony should also be ex-
empt because neither is based upon a borrowing of any kind, but
there is no reported law on the question, and some commentators
apparently disagree. 22 The reduction of tax debts because of the
taxpayer's inability to pay should also be exempt because the tax-
payer borrowed nothing from the government, but somewhat amaz-
ingly, the IRS has asserted in several reported decisions that
taxpayers incur taxable income through such a compromise with
the government.
23
Taxing cancellation of debts where the taxpayer has borrowed
nothing and bought nothing produces the miracle of taxable in-
come without gain. And yet this miracle has come to pass more
than once in the courts because the rules are badly drafted and
poorly understood. I will close this paper with a sampling of the
reported litigation.
C. Confusion in the Courts: Three Wrong Decisions
1. Zarin v. Commissioner
The litigation in Zarin v. Commissione24 provides a fascinating
spectacle of law gone off the rails. The scholarly commentary on
this decision is enormous. 25 The commentators were (and remain)
22. See William A. Klein, Tax Effects of Nonpayment of Child Support, 45 TAX L. REv.
259 (1990), and Richard C.E. Beck, Tax Treatment of Defaulted Child Support: The Better
Approach, 89 TAx NOTES 1073 (2000).
23. The government has never gone so far as to assert that cancellation of a tax
debt by reason of a statute of limitations is taxable, but it appears that nothing is impos-
sible in this area. See generally Richard C.E. Beck, Is Compromise of a Tax Liability Itself
Taxable? A Problem of Circularity in the Logic of Taxation, 14 VA. TAx REv. 153 (1994).
24. 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990), revg. 92 T.C. 1084 (1992).
25. The commentaries at the time include Lee A. Sheppard, A Gambling Exception
to Cancellation of Indebtedness of Income, 49 TAx NOTES 1516 (1990); Calvin H. Johnson,
Zarin and the Tax Benefit Rule: Tax Models for Gambling Losses and the Forgiveness of Gam-
bling Debts, 45 TAx L. REv. 697 (1990); Daniel N. Shaviro, Psychic Income Revisited: Re-
sponse to Professors Johnson and Dodge, 45 TAX L. REv. 707 (1990); Susan Clark Taylor,
Income Taxation - Zarin v. Commissioner: The Viability of the Transactional Approach to
Discharge ofIndebtedness Income, 20 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 235 (1991); Joel S. Newman,
Five Will Get You Ten: You Haven't Heard the Last About Zarin, 50 TAX NOTES 667 (1991);
Alan Gunn, Another Look at the Zarin Case, 50 TAx NOTES 893 (1991); William R. CulpJr.
& Richard E. Marsh Jr., Avoiding Cancellation of Debt Income Where the Liability is Disputed,
74J. TAX'N 288 (1991); Douglas E. Kulper, Taxpayer Rolls the Dice and the IRS Craps Out;
Forgiveness of Gambling Debts is not Income in Zarin v. Commissioner, 1991 UTAH L. REv.
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about equally divided as to whether Zarin should have been taxed.
And very interestingly, the litigation also involved at least two other
forms of "incidental" income already discussed above, namely in-
come from larceny and from gambling.
When the first legal gambling casino, Resorts International,
opened its doors in Atlantic City, Zarin became a compulsive gam-
bler and played dice for 16 hours a day, seven days a week. He
gambled on credit, signing IOUs in exchange for chips, and ran up
a casino debt of $3.4 million for losses at craps before Resorts cut
off further credit. Resorts sued Zarin to collect its debt, and Zarin
resisted payment, claiming the debt was unenforceable under New
Jersey law that forbade the casino from extending excessive credit
(Zarin's credit limit was $200,000, and the New Jersey authorities
had already cited and fined Resorts on some 50 occasions for ille-
gally extending Zarin excessive amounts of credit). Zarin settled
out of court and paid Resorts $500,000 in full satisfaction of the
debt.
At this point the tax authorities stepped in and assessed Zarin
for income tax on gains from larceny or trickery. Apparently some
of Zarin's checks written to Resorts were dishonored for insufficient
funds. The IRS then dropped this theory without explanation,
changed its theory of assessment to COD income, and together with
interest and penalties, demanded much more money from Zarin -
$5.2 million - than the $3.4 million the casino had claimed. The
IRS apparently saw no irony in ruining gamblers with tax debts due
to unenforceable gambling debts, even though the New Jersey law
making unreasonable credit unenforceable was obviously intended
to protect compulsive gamblers from ruin at the hands of casinos.
In the Tax Court, Zarin lost in an en banc decision, eightjudges
to five, in which there were several dissenting opinions. The major-
ity refused to accept the taxpayer's argument that he received noth-
617 (1991); Gregory M. Giangiordano, Taxation - Discharge of Indebtedness - Zarin v.
Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990), 64 TEMPLE L. REv. 1189 (1991); Babette B.
Barton, Legal and Tax Incidents of Compulsive Behavior, 45 TAx LwYR 749 (1992);Jay Katz,
Did Zarin Have a Tufts Day at a Casino Made out of Kirby Lumber?, 26 UC DAvis L. REv.
261 (1992);Jon D. Rigney, Note, Zarin v. Commissioner: The Continuing Validity of Case
Law Exceptions to Discharge of Indebtedness Income, 28 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 981 (1991); and
Deborah A. Geier, Tufts and the Evolution of Debt-Discharge Theoy, I FLA. TAx REv. 115
(1992).
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ing but an opportunity to gamble, and dismissed his persuasive plea
that the IRS's reasoning was perverse because the more he lost, the
more taxes he would owe.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and offered two some-
what different and equally confused arguments. First, the court
found the "disputed debt" doctrine applicable, citing Sobel, despite
the fact that Sobel was actually a purchase-money debt case, and de-
spite the fact that in neither Sobel nor Zarin was the amount of the
debt uncertain or disputed. Second, the court concluded that be-
cause the debt was probably unenforceable under New Jersey law, it
was not within the statutory meaning of "debt" for purposes of cre-
ating COD income. Commentators were quick to point out the
shortcomings of both lines of reasoning. Whether or not the debt
was unenforceable, Zarin had received whatever benefits he had ob-
ligated himself to pay for, and was relieved of that obligation. A
dissenting judge would have upheld the Tax Court on just this
ground that Zarin had enjoyed in the casino the pleasures for
which others would have had to pay $3.4 million.
Some commentators argued that Zarin should have been taxed
because he received value for his debts in the form of "consump-
tion" or "services." Even assuming that cancellation of a debt for
services is taxable, and I think it is not, this reasoning is erroneous.
Resorts performed no services for Zarin that Zarin did not also per-
form for Resorts in return: each promised to pay the other if the
dice came up a certain way. If there were a sale of services of some
kind, the transaction would not be gambling at all - gambling is
the pure creation of risk, and not the sale of anything. Nor is any-
thing consumed in gambling; money simply changes hands. Confu-
sion of gambling with consumption seems to have been caused by
the marketing strategy of casinos that try to present gambling as if it
were some sort of family entertainment like going to the movies or
to a football game. But the economics of gambling are the same
whether it is conducted in a stately pleasure dome, or on a folding
table in a busy sidewalk.
Thus, Zarin received neither money nor goods nor services,
and because he received no consideration in exchange for his debt,
he was left with nothing of value when the debt was canceled, and
he should not be taxed.
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The purpose and effect of the NewJersey law that made Zarin's
debt unenforceable was to undo the gambling transactions them-
selves. The casino should never have provided the credit, and so
the losses should never have occurred, and the parties should be
put back into the positions they were in before the transactions
were entered into. In short, the gambling losses were rescinded.
This is very similar to the situation in Sobel, in which the purchaser
on credit of securities that were improperly registered was allowed a
right of rescission of the purchase.
The result is a tax-free return of capital. If Sobel's stock
purchase had been for cash and the effect of rescission were a re-
turn of Sobel's cash, it would be obvious that the reimbursement
was simply a tax-free return of capital. The same is true for Zarin.
Zarin simply got his money back, he gained nothing, and the casino
lost nothing (except its hoped-for gain).
One lingering doubt lies in the fact that Zarin did (inadver-
tently) receive a sort of option: if he won, he could keep his win-
nings and was under no obligation to rescind the contract.2 6 The
same is true under the securities law, however. If Sobel's stock had
gone up rather than down, Sobel would never have demanded re-
scission of his stock purchase. But the law has never taken account
of such hypothetical gains, and rightly so. There is no tax on the
receipt of valuable business opportunities such as a good job or a
lucrative business contract. Taxes are only imposed when and if the
opportunity is translated into realized gains.
2. Rood v. Commissioner
In a subsequent case involving forgiveness of a gambling debt,
Rood v. Commissioner,27 the taxpayer (a former President of the Asso-
ciation of Trial Lawyers of America) succeeded in negotiating a re-
duced settlement in full of $255,000 for a casino debt of $435,000
to Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas, apparently because the casino de-
26. Incidentally, the value of this option can be calculated, but only by an expert
in statistics. A free line of credit of $3.4 million, where the maximum bet is $15,000 as it
was at Resorts, is worth about $197,000. And rather surprisingly, with the same $15,000
betting limit, a free line of credit of $1 million and of $1 billion is worth exactly the
same, $197,000. See Michael Orkin & Richard Kakigi, What is the Worth of Free Casino
Credit, AM. MATHEMIATICAL MONTHLY, Jan. 1995, at 3-4.
27. 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3125 (1996).
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sired to avoid the time and effort of collection proceedings. Rood
was forced to pay tax on the $180,000 of debt discharged despite
the fact that he made no gain by the reduction of debt, he merely
reduced his loss. In Rood, the debt was apparently enforceable
under Nevada law, and so the exception for unenforceability cre-
ated by the Third Circuit in Zarin did not apply. This erroneous
decision in Rood only confirms the incorrectness of the Third Cir-
cuit's analysis in Zarin. The mistake would have been impossible if
the Third Circuit had decided for Zarin on the correct ground that
he borrowed no money, rather than on the irrelevant ground that
the debt was unenforceable
3. Anderson v. Commissioner
In Anderson v. Commissioner,28 which is a very recent unpub-
lished summary decision from the Tax Court, the taxpayer was held
taxable on the compromise of a credit card debt. The taxpayer had
permitted a friend to use his credit card to make purchases under
an agreement that she would reimburse him for her purchases.
She refused to honor her agreement, leaving the taxpayer to pay
her bills of about $4,500. Anderson was under a clear written obli-
gation to pay the issuing bank, but he did manage to persuade the
bank to reduce the bill by some 30% ($1,372), and paid the remain-
ing 70%.
The taxpayer did not intend to make his friend a gift, and he
did not enjoy the benefit of his friend's purchases. In this situation
it is obvious that the taxpayer suffered a loss, and that the doctrine
of COD income should not apply. In fact, it is reasonably well un-
derstood that cancellation of a guarantor's obligation to pay the
debt of a principal borrower is not COD income for just that rea-
son: the principal debtor, not the guarantor, is the person who re-
ceived the benefit of the loan.2 9 Once again, the source of the
error is that the statute does not limit COD income to loans for
value received.
There appears to be a second source of error in Anderson as
well. The taxpayer seems to have held a worthless debt from his
friend. Creditors may deduct worthless debts if the right conditions
28. T.C. Summ. Op. 2003-169.
29. See Merkel v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 463, 479 (1997).
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are met, and in Anderson's case it appears that if he had paid the
bank the $1,372, he would have been entitled to the bad debt de-
duction. And in turn the COD rules at IRC section 108(e) (2) spec-
ify that COD is tax exempt if payment of the debt would have given
rise to a deduction. That seems to be precisely the situation in An-
derson, and thus no COD income should arise for this reason as
well.
The taxpayer appeared without a lawyer, however, undoubt-
edly because there was only $420 in taxes at stake, and his only ar-
gument appears to have been that he never received the
information report Form 1099-C that the bank sent to the IRS.
V. CONCLUSION
The Puritan spirit of U.S. tax law has led to an overly idealistic
conception of income, which often translates into impractical at-
tempts to tax miscellaneous items that would be better simply to
ignore, as many other more practical governments do. Sometimes,
as in the case of COD income, this jusqu'au-boutisme has the per-
verse effect of taxing losses rather than gains. Taxation is at bottom
a practical business of administration in which ideology should take
second place. Congress should repeal taxes on found property,
gambling, prizes for merit, damages awards for non-physical injury,
and most especially COD income, where the game is simply not
worth the candle.

